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ABSTRACT
HOW TO PREVENT TRADE BASED STOCK PRICE
MANIPULATION
İlalan, Deniz
M.A. Department Of Economics
Supervisor: Prof.Dr.Semih Koray
October 2001
Allen and Gale (1992) construct a model to show that stock price manipulation is
possible. The time structure of their model allows manipulators to pretend “informed”
traders, so that the local investors cannot distinguish what type of entrant they are facing.
When the type of the entrant becomes known to the local investors it is already too late to
make any use of that information. In this study we show that an institution can be
designed in a very natural fashion which induces different behaviours on the part of
manipulators and “informed” traders at the beginning of the process. The institution
designed roughly consists of entitling the entrants to resell stocks at a later date as well if
they wish to do so. As this reasoning is also accessible to manipulators, the designed
institution deters them from entering the market. Regarding the informed traders, their
expected gain from entering the stock market may or may not be positive contingent on
the basic parameters of the model. There are cases, however, when there is an
improvement in the expected total gain of the local investors.
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ÖZET
TİCARİ TABANLI BORSA MANİPÜLASYONLARININ
ENGELLENMESİ
İlalan, Deniz
Ekonomi Bölümü Yüksek Lisans
Danışman: Prof. Dr. Semih Koray
Ekim 2001
Allen ve Gale (1992) borsa manipülasyonunun mümkün olduğu bir model
tasarlamışlardır. Bu modeldeki zaman yapısı manipülatörlerin bilgi sahibi yatırımcı gibi
görünmesini ve böylelikle yerleşik yatırımcıların hangi tip yatırımcıyla karşı karşıya
olduklarını ayırt edememesini mümkün kılmıştır. Giriş yapan aytırımcının tipi yerleşik
yatırımcı tarafınadn bilindiğinde ise bu bilgiden fayda sağlamak için çok geç
kalınmaktadır. Bu çalışmada yerleşik yatırımcıların giriş yapan yatırımcıyı seansın
başında ayırt edebilmesi için doğal bir tasarım kurulmuştur. Bu tasarım kabaca giriş
yapan yatırımcıya arzu etmesi halinde elindeki hisse senetlerini önceki modele kıyasla
daah geç satabilme olanağı sunmaktadır. Bu tasarım manipülatörler tarafından da
bilindiğinden dolayı manipülatörler piyasaya girmekten vazgeçmişlerdir. Bilgi ashibi
yatırımcılar ise beklenen karlarına göre piyasaya girmeyi ya da girmemeyi tercih
etmektedirler. Bu tercih modelin temel verilerine göre değişmektedir. Ancak bazı
durumlarda yerleşik yatırımcılar için beklenen toplam kazanç önceki modele oranla daha
yüksek olmuştur.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Borsa, Manipülasyon, Denge Fiyatı, Tasarım.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Manipulation is a major issue for stock markets. Releasing false information
about the future in an attempt to change the society’s beliefs about stocks is one way of
manipulating the stock prices. This type of manipulators usually spread false information
and try to chance the society’s beliefs. This kind of manipulation can be classified as
information based and is regarded as illegal. Another kind is action based manipulation.
Here manipulators sell more stocks than they actually own. The signal such an action
leads to, conjoined with again spreading false information is expected to force the price
down. Now the manipulators can buy additional stocks at this low price and cover their
short position. This kind of manipulation is also often ruled out by law. The third kind of
manipulation, which is trade based, is not only legal but also hard to observe. It occurs
when a trader attempts to alter the stock prices simply through buying and selling. There
is no false information spreading or short selling involved here. At first glance trade
based manipulation may seem unprofitable. When a trader buys a stock he drives the
price up, if he sells he drives the price down. Thus, one expects trade based manipulation
to be impossible in an efficient market. Actually, this has been shown to be true under
certain conditions by Jarrow (1992).
Allen and Gale (1992), on the contrary, construct a model. Here trade based
manipulation is possible even though all agents are fully rational.
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In this study, we approach the model by Allen and Gale from a wider rationality
angle, allowing the investors to design new institutions as well in case they find these
beneficial. Simply entitling the entrants to resell the stocks they bought also at a later date
than in Allen and Gale model if they wish to do so. This turns out to yield valuable
information to the investors at the outset of the entire process. Namely, instituting the
above time structure induces different actions on the part of manipulators and “informed”
traders at date 1, rendering pretension of “informed” traders unprofitable for
manipulators. Getting deciphered so early deters manipulators’ entry, by inducing their
expected gains to nil. The absence of manipulators also has an impact upon the
“informed” traders, of course. It turns out that, for certain values of the basic parameters,
they still have an incentive to enter the stock market, while, for other values of these, they
prefer to stay out as well. For some cases, the investors benefit from the new institution.
The thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 gives a brief summary of Allen and Gale (1992). Chapter 3 is about the
new institution obtained from the Allen and Gale model through a modification of its
time structure. It is shown this modification closes the market to manipulation. A
numerical example where the outcomes of the two models are being compared is given.
Chapter 4 closes the paper with some concluding remarks.
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CHAPTER 2
“STOCK PRICE MANIPULATION” BY ALLEN AND GALE (1992) –
SUMMARY
The article Allen and Gale (1992) demonstrates the possibility of profitable trade
based manipulation. False information release or insider trading is not present in this
model. There is an uninformed speculator who does not have any privileged information
about the value of the stock in the future. Other than the uninformed speculator there is
also an informed trader. The informed trader has a conjecture about the value of the stock
because of research he has done or access he has had to inside information. When entry
takes place the local investors can not distinguish whether the entrant is informed or not.
In this kind of framework the uninformed speculator called the manipulator can make
profit, provided that the investors attach a positive probability to the manipulator being an
informed trader due to the asymmetry of information.
Trading takes places at three dates indexed by t = 1, 2 and 3. Cash and stock are
the assets in this model. Throughout the model there is no discount factor or depreciation
(except in one case which will be defined later). As described above there are 3 types of
traders: a continuum of identical investors and 2 large traders, an informed trader and a
manipulator. Investors act as price takers.
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The large traders can be treated as risk neutral assuming the stock has no value
after date 3, hence they only care about money. The investors can be treated as risk
averse since the fraction of their wealth held in the stock is large enough.
With probability α  an announcement is made about the value of the stock. The
informed trader knows when an announcement is forthcoming other traders do not. When
there is an announcement to be made, with probability π it is “good news” which
indicates that the value of the stock will be high (denoted by V H ). With probability 1-π it
is “bad news” which indicates that the value of the stock will be low (denoted by V L ).
There are no other values available for a stock and V H  > V L .    At the end of the session
it is either one of these two. If an announcement is “good news” it is made at date 3, if it
is “bad news” it is made at date 2. This is one of the most crucial assumptions made in
this article. Bad news is always released before good news.
At the beginning, only investors are present in the stock market. They hold all of
the stock initially. The total amount of stocks in the market (the investors’ endowment) is
denoted by E where E > 0.
The informed trader only enters the market if he anticipates an announcement
(with probability α ).
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Otherwise he stays out. If there is no announcement in the future, the manipulator
may enter the market (with probability β ).
With probability 1-α - β  there is no entry.
If the informed trader enters the market he is the only large trader present and is
aware of the fact. The manipulator only enters the market if no information is expected.
In other words, the manipulator knows there will be no informed trader in the market.
However, the investors can not distinguish the type of entrant.
All traders wish to maximize their final wealth. This is wealth at date 2 for the
large trader (whatever his type may be) and wealth at date 3 for the investors. The
investor is risk averse and his preferences are represented by a von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function U where U is twice continuously differentiable with U’ > 0
and U’’ < 0.
If no entry takes place on date 1, there is no trade; the stock’s true value and the
equilibrium price is V L .
 It has been assumed that if a large trader enters the market he purchases B > 0
units of stock regardless of his type. At date 2 he sells his entire holding of B units and
leaves the market. If there is an announcement at date 2, which is “bad news”, the true
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value of the stock will be V L  and this will be publicly known and become the
equilibrium price. In this case the large trader must be informed. If there is no
announcement on date 2, there is positive probability that the true value of the stock will
be high. In this case “no news” is “good news” and this drives the price up. However
there is also positive probability that the entrant is a manipulator and there will not be an
announcement on date 3, which reveals the true value of the stock to be V L . The
informed trader and the manipulator are pooling and the equilibrium price reflects the
uncertainty of the investor about the true value of the stock.
At date 3 the investors are alone in the market, holding the initial endowment of
the stock. Either there is an announcement that the stock’s value will be V H  or V L . Since
no large trader is present there can be no trade and the equilibrium price is the true value
of the stock.
Equilibrium is characterized by backward induction. There is no analysis needed
for date 3 since everyone knows the value of the stock at date 3.
For the equilibrium at date 2 several cases have to be considered and
distinguished.
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Equilibrium at date 2
1) A large trader did not enter at date 1
In this case no further analysis is required since no trading occurs. It has been
assumed that this absence reveals the true value of the stock as V L . This is also the
equilibrium price.
2) A large trader entered the market at date 1
If a large trader enters the market he is assumed to buy B > 0 units of stock at
price P1  (B) regardless of his type. The entrant is informed with probability Q1 (B) = α  /
(α + β ).  There can be two situations:
An announcement is made at date 2
           In this situation there is “bad news” which indicates that the true value of the stock
as V L . Since this is publicly known it becomes the equilibrium price P 2 (B) = V L . The
large trader who must be informed sell his entire holding B and the investors are willing
to purchase that amount since there is no uncertainty.
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No announcement is made at date 2
In this case the investors are uncertain about the type of the entrant. If he is an
informed trader then there will be an announcement, “good news”, which reveals the true
value of the stock to be V H . If the entrant is a manipulator then there will be no
announcement at date 3, which reveals the true value of the stock to be V L .
The investor’s objective is to maximize his utility taking the price at date 1,
namely P1 (B) as given and compute the market-clearing price P 2 (B). Here P 2 (B)
actually denotes the “demand” of the investors’.
Let Q 2 (B) = Q1 (B)π / [Q1 (B)π + 1- Q1 (B)] denote the posterior probability that
the large trader is informed given that no announcement has been made at date 2.
Equilibrium price is computed from investors’ first order condition as:
                V H  Q 2 (B) U ‘ (W H (B)) + V L (1 - Q 2 (B)) U ’ (W L (B))
P 2 (B) =
                       Q 2 (B) U ‘ (W H (B)) + (1 - Q 2 (B)) U ’ (W L (B))
where,
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W H (B) = E V H  + (P1 (B) - P 2 (B)) B  (no news is announced at date 2 and the entrant is
an informed trader, hence the stock’s true value is V H )
and
 W L (B) = E V L + (P1 (B) - P 2 (B)) B (no news is announced at date 2 and the entrant is a
manipulator, hence the stock’s true value is V L )
Equilibrium at date 1
We know that no further analysis is required when there is no entry at date 1. The
equilibrium price is V L  for all dates.
 If there is an entry, the entrant purchases B > 0 amount of stock regardless of his
type since the informed trader and the manipulator pool at date 1.
In the second period one of the 3 situations might happen to the representative
investor:
(i) With probability Q1 (B) (1-π ) the entrant is informed and bad news is announced at
date 2. Hence the representative investor’s final wealth will be:
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W L (B) = E V L + (P1 (B) - V L ) B
(ii) With probability Q1 (B) π  the entrant is again informed but good news is announced
at date 3. Hence the representative investor’s final wealth will be:
W H (B) = E V H  + (P1 (B) - P 2 (B)) B
(iii) With probability (1 - Q1 (B)) the entrant is the manipulator and no news will be
forthcoming. Hence the representative investor’s final wealth will be:
W M (B) = E V L +(P1 (B) - P 2 (B)) B
Using these formulas the representative investor maximizes his expected utility
and then computes the market clearing price P1 (B) which is:
          Q1 (B)π U’[W H (B)]V H +Q1 (B)(1-π )U’[W L (B)]V L +(1-P1 (B))U’[W M (B)]V L
P1 (B)=
           Q1 (B)π U’ [W H (B)] +Q1 (B)(1-π ) U’ [W L (B)] + (1-Q1 (B)) U’ [W M (B)]
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It has been implicitly assumed that B is the equilibrium choice. For any amount
other than B assume that the investor’s believe that the entrant is the manipulator. In this
situation the equilibrium price is V L . It is impossible for the large trader to make
arbitrage payoff in this situation. B is optimal for the large trader (both types) if the
informed trader’s payoff is nonnegative:
 π  P 2 (B) B + (1-π ) V L B - P1 (B) B ≥  0
which implies that the manipulator’s payoff [P 2 (B) - P1 (B)] B ≥  0
These conditions and P1 (B) defines a pooling equilibrium.
Proposition: As long as the investors are sufficiently risk averse and the probability of
manipulation β  is sufficiently small, there exists a pooling equilibrium at date 1 in which
the manipulator achieves strictly positive profits.
If the manipulator’s type had been revealed the price profile would be {V L , V L ,
V L }. However in this setup the price profile is:{ P1 (B), P 2 (B), V H  or V L }.
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Some auxiliary assumptions have been made in Allen and Gale (1992) for the
selling amount B to be optimal. First it is been assumed that the market clearing price
P 2 (B) is uniquely determined for every initial condition. Also the investors beliefs are
not effected if the informed trader attempts to buy more than he is able to sell. The large
trader might be better of by selling less than B units in the equilibrium. Since he is acting
as a monopolist he might be better off by restricting supply. However in this situation he
might be even better off by buying less than B units. Hence selling what is bought is
again optimal. Trading might occur more that once. The large trader always wishes to sell
his holdings if the price is positive. The manipulator keeps on imitating the informed
trader. Since investors will only buy at the lowest price, trade can occur at a single price
that is determined by the market clearing condition.
Another critical assumption that is considered in Allen and Gale (1992) is the
impatience of the traders. The informed trader and the manipulator sell their entire
holdings at date 2. The manipulator always finds it optimal to imitate the informed trader.
It is been assumed that the informed trader has more profitable job opportunities if he
leaves the market at date 2. If he waits until the prices become public his opportunity
might be lost. There is also a small discount for the informed trader that the investors
between date 2 and date 3. Hence the informed trader has an incentive to liquidate his
entire holding at date 2.
The time structure of Allen and Gale’s model is in the appendix.
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CHAPTER 3
HOW TO PREVENT TRADE BASED STOCK PRICE
MANIPULATION
 In Allen and Gale (1992) the large trader is restricted to liquidate his entire
holding at date 2 only. Now let us relax this ad-hoc assumption and allow the large trader
to liquidate his entire holding not only at date 2 but also at date 3 if he prefers to do so.
 In this new setup again further analysis is not required when there is no entry. The
equilibrium price is always V L  since there is no trade.  The probability of this event to
occur is 1- α - β  as before.
If there is an entry there are 3 cases to be considered:
Case1: With probability Q1 (1-π ) where Q1 = α / (α + β ), the entrant is an informed
trader and the stock’s value will be V L . This value will be publicly known and also
become the equilibrium price at date 2. The large trader will sell his entire (which he
bought at date 1) holding at price V L  at date 2.
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Case2:  With probability Q1 π  the entrant is again informed but there is no bad news at
date 2 and the stocks’ value will be V H  at date 3. Since the informed trader is able to sell
his holdings also at date 3, it is dominant strategy for him to wait till the price of the stock
is publicly known and sell it at V H  afterwards.
Case3:  With probability 1- Q1  the entrant is a manipulator. However in this situation he
can only sell his entire holding at V L . The reasoning is as follows: If the large trader
wishes to sell his entire holding at date 2 for a price less than V H , the investors will infer
that the entrant is not an informed trader provided that he acts rationally. If he attempts to
sell at price V H  at date 2, it is dominant for the investors to wait until date 3 to buy any
stocks. The investors will only repurchase any stock from a manipulator at price V L .
Other selling prices greater than V L  will be rejected. If the manipulator chooses to wait
until the value of the stock is publicly known (date 3), then the price will again be V L
since no good news will be announced. As a conclusion, the manipulator can only sell his
entire holding at V L ; thus he will not buy any stocks at date 1 for a price higher than V L !
As the large trader is assumed to derive utility from money only (and none from
the stocks) at the end of date 3 and the exact value of the price of the stock becomes
publicly known, it is beneficial for him to sell his entire holding.
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Now let us derive the investors’ supply function at date 1, P1 *(B) by taking into
account the prevailing market clearing prices at date 2 and date 3.Since there is no
discount between date 2 and date 3 we can combine them.
The representative investor wishes to maximize his utility. Here again we assume
that U is a Von-Neumann Morgenstern, twice continuously differentiable utility function
with U’ > 0, U’’ < 0.
Representative investor’s objective is to maximize
Q1 π U (W H *(B)) + Q1 (1-π ) U (W L *(B)) + (1- Q1 ) U (W M *(B))
where
W H *(B) = E V H  + (P1 *(B) - V H ) B
W L *(B) = E V L   + (P1 *(B) - V L ) B
W M *(B) = E V L   + (P1 *(B) - V L ) B
 Notice that W L *(B) = W M *(B). Hence the maximization problem boils down to
Max Q1 π U (W H *(B)) + (1 - Q1 π ) U (W L *(B))
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with respect to B∈  [0,E] for any given P1 *(B).
(P1 *(B) - V H )Q1 π U ‘(W H *(B)) + (P1 *(B) - V L )(1 -Q 1 π ) U ’ (W L *(B))=0    
                       V H  Q1 π U ‘ (W H *(B)) + V L (1 - Q1 π ) U ’ (W L *(B))
P1 *(B) =
                             Q1 π U ‘ (W H *(B)) + (1 - Q1 π ) U ’ (W L *(B))
           Facing this supply function the manipulator’s expected profit is less than or equal
to 0 since he can at most sell his holdings to V L  and any prevailing market clearing price
P∈  [V L , V H  ].  Hence the manipulator prefers to stay out of the stock market. He is only
indifferent between entering and staying out when his expected profit is 0. This only
happens when P1 *(B) = V L .
          Let us check whether this is possible or not.
P1 *(B) = V L
V H  Q1 π U ‘ (W H *(B)) + V L (1 - Q1 π ) U ’ (W L *(B))
                                                                                    = V L
      Q1 π U ‘ (W H *(B)) + (1 - Q1 π ) U ’ (W L *(B))
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V H  Q1 π U ‘ (W H *(B)) + V L (1 - Q1 π ) U ’ (W L *(B))
= V L  Q1 π U ‘ (W H *(B)) + V L  (1 - Q1 π ) U ’ (W L *(B))
V H  Q1 π U ‘ (W H *(B)) = V L  Q1 π U ‘ (W H *(B))
V H  = V L
          Which is impossible since V H  > V L  is the basic assumption of Allen and Gale and
this thesis. Hence we conclude the manipulator never enters the stock market when we
allow trading not only at date 2 but also at date 3.
With this new information the investors revise and update their beliefs.
The equilibrium price is always V L  when there is no entry. If there is an entry the
entrant is with probability 1 informed. Hence the representative investor’s objective is:
Max  π U (W H *(B)) + (1 - π ) U (W L *(B))
subject to B ≥  0.
 (P1 *(B) - V H ) π U ‘ (W H *(B)) + (P1 *(B) - V L ) (1 - π ) U ’ (W L *(B))=0
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                   V H  π U ‘ (W H *(B)) + V L (1 - π ) U ’ (W L *(B))
P1 *(B) =
                       π U ‘ (W H *(B)) + (1 - π ) U ’ (W L *(B))
The informed trader’s expected price before the value of the stock becomes public
is π  V H  + (1 - π ) V L . The informed trader only enters the stock market when π  V H  +
(1 - π ) V L  > P1 *(B). Formally,
                                   V H  π U ‘ (W H *(B)) + V L (1 - π ) U ’ (W L *(B))
π  V H  + (1 - π ) V L  >
                                           π U ‘ (W H *(B)) + (1 - π ) U ’ (W L *(B))
He is indifferent between entering or staying out if the above inequality holds
with equality. He stays out when the inequality holds in the opposite direction.
It is now desirable, of course, to determine for which sets of values of the basic
parameters of the model this inequality holds and thus entry will take place. This awaits
yet to be done, however, if it can be done at all.
Before we state the informed trader’s revenue maximization problem, remember
that the amount bought by the large trader at date 1 will equal the amount he sells at dates
2 and 3, as argues before.
18
We denote the money holding of the informed trader by M, where M≥ 0. Now the
revenue maximization problem of our (risk-neutral) informed trader can be stated as:
Max  [(π  V H  + (1 - π ) V L ) - P1 *(B)] B
subject to [P1 *(B)] B ≤  M
Although it is again desirable to find exactly for what values of parameters
P1 *(B) falls into the class of “regular supply functions” and thus increasing, this turns out
to be a technically unmanageable problem, and so (by confining ourselves to appropriate
parameter values) we simply assume that:
ASSUMPTION: Let P1 *(B) an increasing and continuous supply curve.
Some further assumptions about P1 *(B) and M which will make the informed
trader find it best to spend all his money M to buy stocks at date 1 will considerably
simplify the solution of this agent’s maximization problem under the budget constraint.
This can be achieved by assuming that M is small enough, and P1 *(B) is sufficiently
elastic around B*, where P1 *(B) B* = M.
As we are interested in the existence of stock markets where our institutional
design works, we will continue under this assumption.
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    P 1 *                                                                                                       P 1 *(B)
                                                                                                        π V H  + (1 - π ) V L
               P 1 *(B) B
                                                                                                 B
Now the problem becomes:
Max  (π  V H  + (1 - π ) V L ) B – M
Subject to B ≥  0.
Actually the informed trader’s optimization problem is a single point
maximization problem due to the constraint. Hence, one should check whether
 
[P1 *(B)] B = M
admits a solution for B or not.
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[P1 *(B)] B = M ⇔ B = M / [P1 *(B)]
The left hand side of the equation namely B is always an increasing function of B
since it is the 45 o  line.
In order for this equation to have a solution M / [P1 *(B)] should be a decreasing
function of B in the same interval. If this is true then via Intermediate Value Theorem this
equation admits a solution.
If P1 *(B) is increasing M / [P1 *(B)] is obviously decreasing. As a conclusion B=
M / [P1 *(B)] admits a solution via the Intermediate Value Theorem. Let us denote this
solution by B*.
           If we substitute this obtained result B* into the prevailing market clearing price
P1 *(B) we have P1 *(B*). The informed trader should compare this value with π  V H  +
(1 - π ) V L .
If P1 *(B*) < π  V H  + (1 - π ) V L  then the informed trader will spend all of his
money M for buying the stock.
If P1 *(B*) >π  V H  + (1 - π ) V L  then the informed trader will buy nothing since
he will incur a loss in this situation.
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He is indifferent between buying or not buying when there is equality.
As a result we have observed that this kind of a stock market is close to trade-
based manipulation. The local investors have complete information about the type of the
entrant. The manipulator never enters the market since his expected profit is negative.
The informed trader enters the market according to
the prevailing market clearing price as discussed above. However he also has to respect
his budget constraint.
The next step is to compare the investors’ payoff in this version and in Allen and
Gale (1992).
In Allen and Gale (1992) we have seen that the investor’s payoff was defined as:
U*(B, P1 , Q1 ) = Q1 π U (W H (B, P1 , Q1 )) + Q1 (1-π ) U (W L (B, P1 , Q1 ))
                          + (1- Q1 ) U (W M (B, P1 , Q1 ))
In our context the investor’s payoff is:
U**(B*, P 1 *, Q1 ) = Q1 π U (W H *(B*, P1 *, Q1 ))+Q1 (1-π ) U (W L *(B*, P 1 *, Q1 ))
                          + (1- Q1 ) U (W M *(B*, P1 *, Q1 ))
22
If U*>U** is the case, our model is not beneficial for the investors. Hence Allen
and Gale’s model with manipulation is desirable for the investors.
If the inequality holds in the opposite direction it is beneficial for the investors to
use our model.
If there is equality the investors are indifferent between Allen and Gale’s model
and our model.
Actually, the investor’s risk aversion is the critical assumption here. If the
investors were also risk neutral as the large trader, the expected price for a stock is treated
as the actual price from the agents in the stock market.
Under these circumstances the expected price of the stock in period 2 will be
compared with the expected price of that stock in period 1. There can be 3 cases:
(i) If π  V H  + (1 - π ) V L  = P 2 *(B*) > P1 *(B*) = Q1 π  V H  + (1-Q1 π ) V L
     then the informed trader will spend his entire income on stock.
(ii) If π  V H  + (1 - π ) V L  = P 2 *(B*) = P1 *(B*) = Q1 π  V H  + (1-Q1 π ) V L
      then the informed trader will be indifferent between buying or not
      buying.
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(iii) If π  V H  + (1 - π ) V L  = P 2 *(B*) < P1 *(B*) = Q1 π  V H  + (1-Q1 π ) V L
       then the informed trader will buy nothing
24
A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
Let us try to give a numerical example that compares the two different versions of
the stock market.
Set V H =12, V L =10, α =0.5, π =0.5, E=1, B=0.45,
1- Q1 = 1-[α  / (α + β )] = 0.02 (the posterior probability that the entrant is the
manipulator) and U (x)= - exp (-2x)
 Q 2 = Q1 π / (Q1 π + 1 - Q1 ) = (0.98*0.5) / (0.98*0.5 + 0.02) ≅ 0.96 (the posterior
probability that the large trader is informed, given that no announcement is made at date
2)
           In Allen and Gale (1992) where selling occurs only at date 2, the market clearing
price P 2 (B) (investors’ demand) was:
                  V H  Q 2 U ‘ (W H (B)) + V L (1 - Q 2 ) U ’ (W L (B))
P 2 (B) = 
           Q 2 U ‘ (W H (B)) +  (1 - Q 2 ) U ’ (W L (B))
= 11.9 (refer to Allen and Gale (1992))
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However, in this context where trading at date 3 is also permitted the market
clearing price (investors’ demand)
P 2 *(B*) = π  V H  +  (1-π ) V L
            = 0.5*12 + 0.5*10
             = 11
Let us similarly compute and compare the prevailing market clearing price
(investor’s supply) for both stock markets.
In Allen and Gale (1992) where trading at date 3 is not allowed:
             V H Q1 π U ‘(W H (B))+V L Q1 (1-π )U ’(W L (B))+V L (1-Q1 )U ‘W M ((B))
  P1 (B)=
                    Q1 π U ‘(W H (B)) + Q1 (1-π )U ’(W L (B)) + (1-Q1 ) U ‘(W M (B))
= 10.9 (refer to Allen and Gale (1992))
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In Allen and Gale (1992) the large trader buys stock at P1 (B)= 10.9 and sells at
P 2 (B)= 11.9, hence ending up with a revenue B. In this version the purchasing price
P 2 *(B*) was 11 with the given parameters. If the buying price is P1 *(B*)=10= V L  the
revenue of the large trader is B*. Every other price different from P1 *(B*)=10= V L
yields a revenue less than B* for the local investors. However we know that
P1 *(B*)=10= V L  is impossible since V H  ≠ V L . Hence the expected revenue for the
informed trader is less than B*. In order to compare these two for this example B* should
be computed.
We know that P1 (B) B = M is the situation in Allen and Gale (1992). Hence M =
10.9*0.45 = 4.905. Now let us give the same income to the informed trader in our version
and compute B*.
[P1 *(B*)] B* = M
V H  π U ‘ (W H *(B*)) + V L (1 - π ) U ’ (W L *(B*))
                                                                                  = [4.905 / B*]
    π U ‘ (W H *(B*)) + (1 - π ) U ’ (W L *(B*))
W H *(B*) = E V H  + (P1 (B*) - V H ) B* = 12 + [(4.905 / B*) – 12] B*
W L *(B*) = E V L   + (P1 (B*) - V L ) B* = 10 + [(4.905 / B*) – 10] B*
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Hence,
     -12*0.5*24*exp (-33.81+24B*) - 10*0.5*20exp(-29.81+20B*)
                                                                                                                      = [4.905 / B*]
            -0.5*24*exp (-33.81+24B) - 0.5*20* exp(-29.81+20B*)
B*≅ 0.48 (Mat-Lab, see the appendix)
We are not able compare the informed trader’s expected revenue for both models.
Although we know that his revenue is strictly less than 0.48 we do not know whether it is
greater or less than 0.45. However he may have still incentive to enter this version of the
stock market if his expected profit is positive. For this, we have to compute P1 *(B*) and
compare it with
P 2 *(B*) = π  V H  +  (1-π ) V L =11.
Let us abbreviate the notation and denote P1 *(B*) as P1 *, and the derivative of
that as P1 *’. Hence
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P1 *= [0.5*12*2*(P1 *- 12)*P1 *’exp (-2(12+(P1 *- 12)*0.48)
        +0.5*10*2*(P1 *- 10)*P1 *’exp (-2(10+(P1 *- 10)*0.48)]
      / [0.5*2*(P1 *- 12)*P1 *’exp (-2(12+(P1 *- 12)*0.48)
        +0.5*2*(P1 *- 10)*P1 *’exp (-2(10+(P1 *- 10)*0.48)]
This equation admits no solution, hence an equilibrium price P1 * due to a
discontinuity problem. (See the graph in the Appendix)
However we can make the following comparison:
If P1 *≤ 11 (assume without loss of generality the informed trader enters the
market when he is indifferent) the informed trader has an incentive to enter the market
since his expected revenue is non-negative.
Now consider the best possible scenario from the investors’ side when the
informed trader has an incentive to enter the market which is P1 *= 11. For this situation
let us compare U* and U** namely the expected utilities of the investors for both models.
For Allen and Gale, 1992:
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U*(B, P1 , Q1 ) = Q1 π U (W H (B, P1 , Q1 )) + Q1 (1-π ) U (W L (B, P1 , Q1 ))
                          + (1- Q1 ) U (W M (B, P1 , Q1 ))
= -0.98*0.5*exp-2[12+(10.9-11.9)0.45] – 0.98*0.05*exp-2[10+(10.9-10)0.45]
   -0.02*exp-2[10+(10.9-11.9)0.45]
= -0.49*exp(-23.1)-0.49*exp(-20.81)-0.02(-19.1)
For our version:
U**(B*, P 1 *, Q1 ) = Q1 π U (W H *(B*, P1 *, Q1 ))+Q1 (1-π ) U (W L *(B*, P 1 *, Q1 ))
                          + (1- Q1 ) U (W M *(B*, P1 *, Q1 ))
= -0.98*0.5*exp-2[12+(11-12)0.48] - 0.98*0.5*exp-2[10+(11-10)0.48]
   -0.02*exp-2[10+(11-10)0.48]
= -0.49*exp(-23.04)-0.51*exp(-20.96)
Let us multiply both equalities with exp(19.1) hence,
exp(19.1)U*(B, P1 , Q1 )= -0.49*exp(-4)-0.49*exp(-1.71)-0.02
≅ -0.1318
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exp(19.1)U**(B*, P1 *, Q1 )= -0.49*exp(-3.94)-0.51*exp(-0.96)
≅ -0.2138
Notice that U* > U** , thus we can say that if entry occurs the utility loss in our
version is more than the utility loss in Allen and Gale’s model (even in the best possible
case!).
If P1 *>11, the informed trader prefers to stay out since his expected revenue is
negative. However, this is the best possible situation for the local investors since their
utility will be U**=0, which is greater than any negative number, hence any possible
utility. Thus, we can say preventing entrance is the best thing for the investors in such a
stock market.
As a conclusion, our model is desirable for the local investors in this example
when entry is entirely prevented. If there is entry, the local investors would prefer Allen
and Gale’s construction. Thus, they will allow manipulation.
Instead of introducing a high discount factor between date 2 and date 3 or making
auxiliary ad-hoc assumptions as done in Allen and Gale (1992), we can let the local
investors to consider allowing trade also at date 3 as we have done here. If the basic
parameters are set like in this example, the local investors will tend to preclude trade at
date 3 hence automatically prefer Allen and Gale’s model to our model. In addition the
large traders will not object to that preclusion and manipulation will be allowed.
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Furthermore, we can arrange the basic data in such a way that our model is
desirable. By increasing the possibility of manipulation we can reduce the prevailing
market clearing prices for both periods and make comparisons after that.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Here we have shown that a modification in the institutional design rules out entry
of manipulators. In the particular context of Allen and Gale (1992), if the design turns out
to also deter entry of “informed” traders, then the investors clearly prefer the new design
to Allen and Gale’s design under which they incur an expected positive loss. A more
thorough comparison between the outcomes these two designs yield is yet to be done
when “informed” traders still have incentives to enter the market under the new design.
Throughout this thesis there was no discount factor. If we take this into account,
we are not able to combine the prevailing prices on date 2 and date 3 so easily. If we
introduce a high discount factor only between date 2 and date 3 this thesis will look like
Allen and Gale (1992) model. However the magnitude of this discount factor plays an
important role. Also situations change when the discount factor is placed not only
between date 2 and date 3 but also between date 1 and date 2. In any case it must be
thoroughly analysed and new market clearing prices must be computed under these
circumstances.
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>> solve(' (-144*x*exp(-33.81+24*x)-100*x*exp(-29.81+20*x))/ (-12*exp(-33.81+24*x)-10*exp(-
29.81+20*x))=4.905')
ans =
.47811500536329413015983168103597
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